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Ecolabelling as a tool to ensure sustainability in the seafood value chain is gaining popularity in 
recent times. As a market-led intervention, ecolabel-enabled fishery certification rides on the wil-
lingness of the ecologically concerned seafood consumer to pay a premium price for the fish har-
vested from a sustainable fishery on the one hand, and the sensitivity of the multinational food 
chain fraternity to the reputational risks associated with the food they deal with, on the other. The 
market opportunity arising from this scenario is effectively harnessed by third-party certification 
agencies that assess the sustainability of a fishery and certifies it for a fee. However, analysing the 
existing scenario through the lens of the political economy behind property rights, this article  
argues that the entry of non-state entities in the ecolabelling business is not without problems which 
the state should be concerned about. 
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IF sustainability can come with a price tag and market can 
take the stewardship role, you have a win-win tool – this 
seems to be the neo-liberal raison d’etre of ecolabelling, 
a recent tool that promises to solve the vexed problem of 
unsustainability in the seafood industry. Ecolabel-enabled 
certification is the new game gaining popularity and criti-
cism as well in the global discourse on market-led inter-
ventions which are aimed to ensure sustainability in the 
seafood value chain1–11. Being a widely traded commodi-
ty, marine fish have always hogged the sustainability  
limelight in the context of increasing reports of fishery 
declines across the globe. For instance, according to Food 
and Agriculture Organization12, of all the assessed fish 
stocks, 58.1% is fully fished. 
 The concept of ecolabelling makes use of the purchas-
ing power of the ‘concerned consumer’ to ensure that a 
production ecosystem, like a fishery or a forest is ma-
naged sustainably. We do not mind paying a premium if 
you prove that the fish you have harvested is from a sus-
tainably managed fishery – is what the consumers are 
nudged to say to the fisher. For a concerned fish eater, 
ridden with the guilt of making a repugnant purchasing 
choice, his/her neo-liberal altruism is worth emulation, 
especially when the fisher producer is portrayed as an  
irredeemable victim of the tragedy of the commons13. 
Another concerned party is the multinational food chain 
fraternity who are sensitive to the reputational risks asso-
ciated with the food they deal with. As a means to  
address this, they are equally or more keen on ecolabel-
ling of fish and fish products sold through their outlets. 
The logic is too appealing to the eco-philanthropist as 
well as the value-chain optimist. But as the saying goes, 
the devil or god is in the details. This article is an attempt 
to distinguish them. The brief analysis is mainly done 
through the lens of the political economy behind property 
rights. We argue that entry of non-state entities in the  
fisheries governance regime is not without problems, 
which the state should be concerned about. 
Why label marine fish? 
Labelling is a market-friendly information key for quali-
fying certain attributes of a commodity to help the con-
sumer in exercising a purchasing choice. Ecolabel, 
making a distinction from conventional labels which  
indicate origin and content of products, implies the con-
cern for ecological correctness or green consciousness as 
a source of economic and ethical value addition. It pro-
vides information on the environmental impact of a pro-
duct. This is different from the labelling of food safety 
aspects of a commodity like absence of harmful chemi-
cals as in the case of organic farm products. Though  
organic certification also considers the eco-friendliness of 
the production process, the consumer is more attracted by 
the food safety benefits than the ecosystem benefits. 
GENERAL ARTICLES 
 
CURRENT SCIENCE, VOL. 118, NO. 10, 25 MAY 2020 1497
 An ecolabel in the case of a wild-caught or marine fish 
say, tuna or shrimp, is the result of certifying the sustai-
nability of the fishery from which the fish has been har-
vested (note 1). As is obvious, it does not appeal to the 
health per se of the individual consumer, but to the health 
of the fishery. To catch the eco-consciousness of the con-
cerned consumer in order to motivate the producer to 
adopt such practices that save the fish from overfishing or 
depletion is the logic of an eco-label. It shifts, partially, 
the burden of responsible behaviour from the producer or 
the State to the consumer who is willing to reciprocate by 
paying a premium price. This is an option Hardin did not 
see, i.e. preventing the freedom-lead ruin in the commons 
through a nudged regulatory regime invoked by the market 
rather than the State. Though as a business model it makes 
economic and ecological sense, it is ridden with many  
issues that border fishery governance and food sovereignty. 
The property rights perspective 
Marine fishery, considered as one of the last natural food 
production frontiers, is a common pool or open-access re-
source vulnerable for exhaustion. The unique property 
rights nature of the marine resource ecosystem leaves  
little stewardship incentives to the individual fisher – 
practising commercial or industrial hunting – whose sole 
(rational) aim is rent maximization (rent is nothing but 
profit, a term preferred by fisheries economists to em-
phasize the ‘public goods’ nature of the factor of produc-
tion). But rent realization or maximization is limited by 
the inherent regenerative capacity of a fish stock. It is this 
sustainability reference point that decides whether what is 
being done is fishing or ‘finishing’. An individual fisher 
who literally reaps without sowing has no control over the 
production cycle which remains open (however, by deve-
loping breeding technology, the life cycle of a marine fish 
can be closed and production can be augmented through 
appropriate mariculture technologies). The tragedy of over-
exploitation occurs due to the absence of precautionary 
regulations that keep the fishing intensity well below the 
biological or economic threshold. The resource users of-
ten attribute non-compliance of rules or regulations to the 
lack of a sense of ownership. The ‘free rider’ problem be-
comes rampant as it injects sufficient rationality to what is 
actually a livelihood myopia. By certifying the sustainabi-
lity of a fishery, the argument goes, stakeholders (both pro-
ducers and marketers) become more responsible as their 
actions are appropriately incentivized. Ecolabel offers a 
premium price or even a condition for market access for the 
fish they place in the value chain. Thus, a market-driven 
solution is eulogized for a collective-driven problem. 
How an ecolabel works 
Ecolabelling works on the principle of assessment of 
standards. That is, you need to have not only a set of 
standards that define sustainable fisheries, but also an  
assessment protocol. Unlike organic farming, the trust 
deficit existing between the fish consumer and fish pro-
ducer is huge in the case of a seafood ecolabel. It is  
almost impossible for the fish consumer to verify whether 
the standards are followed in a marine fishery, which is 
invisible and often fugitive. This demands a mechanism 
to bridge the trust deficit between the producer and con-
sumer. There could be three types of such bridging  
mechanisms: (i) self-declaration by the fisher; (ii) The 
state making a public declaration, and (iii) private or 
third-party declaration. 
 It is obvious that the first option is of limited utility 
because (a) fisheries not being a private property does not 
limit other users who may not follow the standards, and 
(b) sustainability depends on the big picture which the  
individual fisher is unable to generate. 
 Regarding the second option, the state, being the de 
jure owner of the marine fisheries resources within the 
Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), has the steward-
ship responsibility for ensuring that it is managed  
sustainably. In India, a federal system of fisheries gover-
nance is in place. The maritime states have the gover-
nance responsibility for the territorial waters (which is up 
to 12 nautical miles) and the Central Government takes 
care of the rest of the EEZ (which is up to 200 nautical 
miles). The total area of the Indian EEZ is 2.02 million 
sq. km, which roughly amounts to two-thirds of our land 
area. Since marine fisheries governance is dependent on a 
continuous scientific assessment of the marine ecosystem, 
a public-funded research system is mandated in India for 
the monitoring and assessment of sustainability of fish 
stocks and the fisheries they encompass. The ICAR-
Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute (CMFRI), 
Kochi and Fisheries Survey of India (FSI), Mumbai play 
prominent roles here. So the State, being not only the de 
jure owner but also the custodian of the necessary infor-
mation and knowledge, is the ideal agent to certify a  
fishery, respecting the public goods nature of the resource. 
This was the logic used by Iceland where the Fisheries 
ministry had declared, after systematic assessment done 
by their mandated research institute, that they were prac-
tising responsible fisheries in their entire EEZ (note 2). 
 The third-party mechanism is the apple in the ecolabel-
ling market eye. Similar to organic farming, there are 
many players acting as bridging mechanisms. The Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC), which is borne out of an  
alliance between Unilever and World Wide Fund for Na-
ture (WWF), now based in London, UK, is the market 
leader (another dominant player is Friend of the Sea, 
Headquartered at Milan, Italy). Being the innovator of the 
very idea behind seafood ecolabel done on the forestry 
model for timber, MSC claims a global market penetra-
tion of 7–8% with a total number of 110 fisheries  
carrying the MSC label. They have already made their 
presence felt in India by way of certifying a fishery of 
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short- necked clam in Ashtamudi lake, Kerala. The price 
premium in the export market is their unique selling 
proposition (USP). We set the standards, we get the fishery 
assessed by a neutral party, and you manage – is the  
bargain they make before putting a price tag for the cer-
tificate which starts from 0.5% of the net wholesale value 
of labelled products. The certificate is issued to a group 
of operators in the fishery for a price and a period. The 
cost of marine fisheries management is obviously borne 
by the state. A few countries like New Zealand, where the 
cost of research and management is borne by the industry 
itself, are exceptions. Surprisingly, there is not much  
information in the public realm on the cost of certifying a 
fishery in India by MSC. 
What is being certified? 
A fishery is the interface between a fish stock and fisher 
stakeholders. A fishery is not a farm. The way an orchard 
of mango is certified as organic is not possible for a sar-
dine fishery. Whether the orchard is privately owned or 
community owned or even state owned, the boundary of 
the property makes the certification process atomized and 
exclusive. So the unit of certification is less nebulous and 
contested. In the case of organic farming, it is the com-
modity that is certified organic and not the farm. But in 
the case of a wild-caught seafood, the certification is 
meaningful only if three conditions are met: (a) the boun-
dary conundrum does not exist or the resource is area-
confined like benthic resources that dwell at the sea  
bottom; (b) the number of harvesters is limited or mana-
geable so that traceability along the chain of custody is 
less cumbersome (e.g. a portion of a lake), and (c) the  
nature of fisheries management has a semblance of priva-
tization (for instance, the quota system of output-based 
fisheries management, common in temperate water coun-
tries, works on the principle of privatization of a public 
good). Paradoxically, a well-managed fishery is a sure 
candidate for certification. A poorly managed fishery  
remains the liability of the state. 
The labelling perils 
The situation is totally different in the case of fisheries in 
India. The public goods nature of the resource needs to be 
protected as a constitutional obligation of providing equal 
livelihood opportunities to those who depend on it. By 
way of license and registration issued by the Government, 
the fishers are allowed to make a living by producing 
enough commercially sustainable surplus. The whole 
process is mediated by management regulations based on 
the best available science14. There is no ambiguity in the 
fact that sustainability of the resource is also a public 
good to be enjoyed by all citizens of this country. 
 It is here that the idea of third-party private certifica-
tion enters rough weather. Unlike elsewhere, certifying a 
fishery for an exclusive group of resource users is an im-
probable strategy here. As an instrument of profit-making 
out of the fisheries sustainability pie, the option of  
providing an inclusive certificate does not make much 
economic sense either. If so, how can one explain the 
persistence of certain global players in the country? 
 Ecolabel for them is suspected to be a euphemism for 
market monopoly both in terms of the certification busi-
ness and seafood trade in general. It indeed makes  
business sense. What it does not share is the governance 
responsibility of the state. By way of allowing eco-
labelling a common pool resource, the state, which is the 
de jure owner of the resource, is not only abdicating its 
stewardship responsibility but also donating the mana-
gerial benefits of sustainability, which again is a public 
good, to a non-state entity. In fact, the ecolabel does not 
solve any management problem. If a fishery is meeting 
the standards set by the labelling agency, a selected group 
of stakeholders is given the ecolabel for the fishery where 
they operate. Ecolabel is given because the fishery is  
managed well. Most often, the cost of managing the  
fishery sustainably well is borne by the public. The State  
Departments of Fisheries as well as the fisheries research 
institutes are public-funded institutions. But the benefit 
(by way of either a premium price or market access) is 
accrued to a few private players who afford the certifica-
tion process through the certifying agent after paying a 
heavy licence fee. It is like a football referee charging  
the winning team a heavy price for declaring who the 
winner is. 
 Since there are many players in the eco-labelling busi-
ness, the number of fisheries brought under the certifica-
tion umbrella of a particular brand provides market 
advantage to the certifying firm. The aim of players like 
MSC is to retain their monopoly in the ecolabel market. 
Since they are catering to the green consciousness of rich 
consumers, they are on the lookout of poster fishes, espe-
cially from less developed countries, which improve their 
market visibility and green credibility. It is interesting to 
note that the certifying firm is even willing to waive the 
normal processing fee for developing countries. MSC has 
given ecolabel certification to two molluscan fisheries, 
the Ben Tre Clam in Vietnam and Ashtamudi short- 
necked clam in India, without charging the normal fee 
from the stakeholders. This is a clear departure in their 
otherwise exclusive approach practiced in other countries 
where they have operation. 
 The threat of ecolabel becoming a condition for market 
access and thus a potential trade barrier looms large in 
this grey area. The State of Fisheries and Aquaculture15 
cautions that, while many trade facilitating tools have  
legitimate objectives, in practice, some of them, including 
private standards, traceability and certification require-
ments can create potential obstacles and restrict market 
GENERAL ARTICLES 
 
CURRENT SCIENCE, VOL. 118, NO. 10, 25 MAY 2020 1499
access. Presently, voluntary standards are not covered 
under the Technical Barriers to Trade negotiations of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). However, WTO  
acknowledges the fact that, even voluntary standards can 
cause trade distortions, especially in the case of unincor-
porated process and production methods (PPM)16  
(note 3). 
 Another concern is the likely polarization of fish con-
sumers in India. The large majority of consumers who 
obviously cannot afford the premium price demanded by 
the eco-labelled products, are deemed to be consuming 
fish sourced from an ill-managed fishery in the country. 
In other words, an intervention by a non-state entity is 
making the larger public deprived of enjoying the bene-
fits of sustainably managed fisheries in our EEZ. The  
responsibility of guaranteeing the domestic fish consum-
ers that they are supplied with fish which is harvested 
from a sustainable fishery lies entirely with the state. 
Otherwise, the public-sector investment in the allied  
public-funded institutions that cater to fisheries adminis-
tration and research becomes dubious. 
 It is time that the government should promulgate a self-
certification on the sustainability of its marine fish  
resources based on appropriate or compatible standards, 
and the same be bestowed with binding equivalence for 
validity by non-state entities plying the export-oriented 
seafood certification schemes in the country. The very 
idea of bartering food sovereignty over an impaired foreign 
exchange reserve seems to be anachronistic. Marine fi-
sheries governance system in our country is not yet ready 
for allowing neoliberal market forces to wield the pretext 
of a stewardship responsibility for gaining market access. 
It is strange that international multi-partnership organiza-
tions formed by sovereign nations to bolster cooperation 
in the responsible stewardship of the global commons 
have failed to fathom the way their governance as well as 
free trade responsibilities are compromised. 
 
Notes 
 
1. The standards under the UN Convention on Law of the Sea, UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement and Code of Conduct for Responsible  
Fisheries, are mainly considered for framing the ecolabelling certi-
fication criteria. In recent times, there are calls to expand the crite-
ria to include social standards, mainly to ensure that the fishery 
engages labour in conformity with ILO Work in Fishing Conven-
tion 188. 
2. However, subprime-driven economic recession forced the country 
to toe the Marine Stewardship Council line, because the export-
oriented fishing industry of Iceland has huge stake in accessing the 
international seafood trade. 
3. Denotes process and production methods that leave no trace in the 
final product, so that the consumer cannot ascertain whether a 
product hails from a sustainably managed production system or not 
just by visual observation, which obviously is true in the case of 
marine fish. 
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